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[L.A. No. 28980. In Bank. Oct. 30,1967.] 
• ARTHUR E. HEMMERLING et al., Cross-complainants and 
Appellants, v. TOMLEV, INC. et al., Cross-defendants 
and Respondents. 
[1] Easements-Appurtenant: Merger: Waters-Namre of Ease-
ment.-Where owners of different land holdings combined to 
purchase a separate parcel and to share the cost of the instal-
lation 9f a well thereon to supply water to their respective 
lands, the water right of each owner was an easement appur-
tenant to his own land separate from his eommon interest in 
the fee of the parcel, and the fact that each party owned a fee 
interest in both his scparate dominant estate and in the ser-
vient estate did not extinguish the easements by merger, for 
the ownership interests in the two estates were not coextensive. 
[2a, 2b] Eminent Domain-Proceedings-Findings-Water Ease-
ments: Reversible Error.-On the extinguishment, by condem-
nation, of water easements that were appurtenant to separate 
dominant estates and usable only to provide water for their 
irrigation, the value of each easement, for which each eon-
demnee was entitled to be compensated, was the diminution in 
market value of the dominant tenement caused by the loss of 
the easement, and it was reversible error in such a case for the 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Easements, § 41; Am.Jur.2d, Easements, 
S108. 
McR.Dig. References: [1] Easements, §§ 5, 45; Waters, § 236; 
[2] Eminent Domain, §§ 164, 182; Easements, § 62; Waters, § 260; 
[3] Trial, § 337(4); [4] Eminent Domain, § 78; Waters, § 259; 
[6] Eminent Domain, § 89; [6] Eminent Domain, § 76. 
-Reporter '. Note: This case wns previously entitled, "Pe9ple ell: reI. 
Department of Public Works v. Hemmerling." 
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trial court not to make an express finding on the assessed 
value of one of the easements separately from the value of the 
fee interest in the condemned well site, where the condemnees 
concerned had specifically requested a finding on that issue 
and had introduced substantial evidence as to the easement's 
value to support a finding in their favor. 
[3] Trial - Finding Ultimate Facts - When Findings Cannot Be 
Implied.-In a proceeding in eminent domain in which the 
trial court made no express finding on the value of a water 
easement extinguished by the condemnation, Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 634, precluded, on appeal, an inferred finding adverse to the 
condemnees' contentions on such value, where they had made a 
written request for a specific finding on that crucial issue. 
[4:] Eminent Doma.in-Compensation-Evidence as to Damages-
Value of Water Easement.-On the issue of the value of a 
water easement, servient to a dominant estate until extin-
guished by the condemnation of the site of the water source, 
_ the condemnees' testimony of the increased cost of procuring 
water elsewhere was relevant as concerning an element which 
a reasonable person would consider in arriving at the final test 
of difference in fair market value. 
[6] Id.-CompensatioD-Evidence as to Damages-Opinion Evi-
dence.-Although the owner of property is competent to tes-
tify to its value, the trial court is not bound by the opinions 
of the witnesses on market value. The province of such testi-
mony is only to aid the court in arriving at a conclusion. 
[6] Id. - Compensation - Water Easement. - On the extinguish-
ment of water easements through the condemnation of a 
1,000-square-foot well site supplying water to separate domi-
nant estates in the vicinity, the condemnees were entitled to 
compensation for the value of the site and of the easements, 
but not for severance damages, where, although the site was 
the source of the water, the condemnees' fee interest in the 
site itself cont.ributed nothing to the enjoyment of the estates 
retained. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior court of Orange 
County. Warren J. Ferguson, Judge. Reversed. 
Cross-complaint for a larger share of a condemnation 
~ward apportioned for well site taken in an eminent domain 
proceeding. Judgment of condemnation apportioning dam-
[6] Unity or contiguity of properties essential to allowance of 
damages in eminent domain proceedings on account of remaining 
property, note, 6 A.L.R.2d 1197. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Eminent 
Domain, § 108; Am.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 315. 
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ages reversed as to valuation of cross-complainant's water - ---
easement. 
Richards, Watson & Hemmerling, Clifford A. Hemmerling 
and Ronald M. Greenberg for Cross-complainants and Ap-
pellants. 
Baird, Holley, Baird & Galen, James Michael Welch and 
Leonard B. Hankins for Cross-defendants and Respondents. 
Harry S. Fenton, R. B. Pegram, Richard L. Franck, Charles 
E. Spencer, Jr., and Robert W. Vidor as Amici CUriae. 
TRA YNOR, C. J.-This action involves the condemnation 
of approximately 1,000 square feet of land (parcel 4) located 
('ast of Anaheim in Orange County. The parcel was owned in 
undivided interests by defendants Arthur E. Hemmerling and 
Hulda M. Hemmerling, a group of corpo~ations, and Holly 
Wade Davidson. The Hemmerlin~s appeal from the judgment 
apportioning the condemnation award. 
Parcel 4 was owned in common by defendants subject to an 
agreement executed by them or their predecessors in interest 
on Fe~ruary 5, 1926. All of the parties to the agreement 
individually owned other land in the vicinity of parcel 4. The 
1926 agreement provided for thE' formation of a voluntary, 
llonprofit association whose members would be the owners of 
parcel 4. The association's purpose was to construct and oper-
ate a water well and pumping plant on parcel 4 and an irriga-
tion pipeline system from the well to the lands of the mem-
bers. The agreement set forth the interests of the parties in 
parcel 4 and provided that each party should share in the 
costs of installation and maintenance of the well and plant in 
the proportion of his acreage to the total acreage of all the 
members. A 1939 amendment provided that the interests of 
the parties in the water system were appurtenant to their 
respective separately owned lands. Any party could elect not 
to take his share of water, and during any period he so 
I'Iected, he would not be obligated to pay any of the costs of 
operating the system. 
Before the condemnation action was commenced, both the 
corporations and Davidson elected not to take water from the 
system until further notice. At the time of the trial their 
lands were being used for industrial purposes, and no likeli-
hood appears that they will again be used for purposes requir-
ing irrigation. The Hemmerlings, however, continued to take 
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water from the system until the time of trial and were the 
only owners using water on the date of the filing of the com-
plaint. 
In condemning parcel 4 for freeway purposes plaintiff 
f'lected to proceed under section 1246.1 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, which provides that the total amount of the award 
for the property is to be first determined as between the plain-
tiff and all defendants and then apportioned among the 
defendants in further proceedings. 
The parties stipulated It that the total compensation to be 
paid for the taking of parcel 4 and all interests therein, is the 
sum of $9,450" and waived findings on this issue. After the 
trial on the issue of apportionment the court found that the 
Hemmerlings, the corporations, and Davidson were entitled to 
share in the award in the proportion that the separate acreage 
of each bore to the total of their combined separate acreage. 
The Hemmerlin~ contend that the trial court erred in fail-
lng to value the water easement of each party separately from 
his respective fee interests in parcel 4 (see Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1248) and in failing to make a finding on the issue of Sever-
ance damages. They also assert that the trial court eqed in 
disregarding their valuation evidence since it was uncontra-
(licted and unimpeached. 
[1] The water right of each party to the 1926 agreement 
was an easement appurtenant to his own land separate from 
his interest in common with the other parties in the fee of 
parcel 4. The fact that each party owned a fee interest in both 
his separate dominant estate and in the servient estate did not 
extinguish the easements by merger, for the ownership inter-
ests in the two estates were not coextensive. (Ch6da v. Bodkin 
(1916) 173 Cal. 7, 17 [158 P. 1025]; see Porto v. Vosti (1955) 
136 CaI.App.2d 395, 397 [288 P.2d 618].) 
[20.] Since the condemnation of parcel 4 extinguished the 
easements, defendants were entitled to compensation for 
them. When, as in this case, the easements are appurtenant 
and can be used only to provide water for irrigation of the 
dominant estates, the value of each easement is the diminution 
in the market value of the dominant tenement caused by its 
loss. (People ex reI. Dept. of Public Works v. Logrm (1961) 
398 CalApp.2d 581, 586 [17 Cal.Rptr. 674], and cases cited; 
see Jahr, Eminent Domain (1957) § 160; 4 Nichols, Easement 
(3d ed. 1962) § 12.41; 1 Orgel, Valuation Under the Law of 
Eminent Domain (2d ed. 1953) § 111, at p. 476, fn. 36; cf. 
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United States v. 4.105 Acres of Land in P1.easanto-n, (N.D. 
Cal. 1946) 68 F.Supp. 279, 292.) 
Section 1248, subdivision 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure 
provides that the court must assess the «, value of the property 
sought to be condemned, . . . and of each and every separate 
t'state therein; ... " Accordingly, the trial court should 
Jlave assessed the values of the easements separately from thc 
values of the respective fee interests in parcel 4. It dOES not 
appear from the findings of fact and conclusions of law th~t __ 
the trial court did so. [8] Moreover, we may not infer a find-
ing adverse to the Hemmerlings on the value of their ~ 
ment, for they "made a written request for a specific find-
ing" on that issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 634; Culbertso-n v. 
C'izek (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 451, 465 [37 Cal.Rptr. 548]; 
Mock v. Shulman (1964) 226 Ca1.App.2d 263, 268 [38 Cal. 
Rptr. 39].) They requested that the court appraise the fair 
market· value of their appurtenant right to use water at 
$9,000. This request was not one for a finding of an eviden-
tiary fact (see South Santa Clara Water etc. Did. v. Johnslm 
(1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 388, 404-405 [41 Cal.Rptr. 846]), but 
for a finding of an ultimate fact on a crucial issue. [2b] Un-
der section 634 the trial court was not at liberty to disre~ 
gard the request to make a finding on that issue because it. 
disagreed with the Hemmerlings as to what that finding' 
should be. 
The failure of the trial court to make any finding on the value 
of the Hemmerlings' water right is reversible 'error, for they 
introduced substantial evidence fu support a finding in their 
favor. (Parker v. Shell Oil Co. (1946) 29 Ca1.2d 503, 512 [175 
P.2d 838] ; Sam Jose etc. Title In:r. Co. v. Elliott (1952) 108 
Cal.App.2d 793,801 [240 P.2d 41].) [4] Arthur Hemmerling 
testified that the value of the pumping plant and well site was 
$450, that the value of his water right was $9,000, and that it 
would be substantially more expensive for him to procure 
water elsewhere. Although his testimony was not expressed in 
the form of an opinion that his separate property had dimin-
ished in value by the sum of $9,000, there is no indication 
that he used any other method to reach this figure. His testi-
mony as to the increased cost of water was relevant to that 
issue since it is one of the ,« elements which a reasonable per-
son would consider in arriving at the final test of difference in 
fair market value. . . ." (City of Rit1erside v. Kraft (1962) 
203 Cal.App.2d 300, 304 [21 Cal.Rptr. 425] ; County of Santa 
Clara. v. Curtner (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 730, 744 [54 Cal. 
Rptr.257].) 
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We cannot agree, however, with the Hemmerlings' conten-
tion that the trial court was bound to accept their uncontra-
dicted valuation testimony. [5] Although the owner of 
property is competent to testify to its value (City of Gilroy v. 
Filice (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 259,268 [34 Cal.Rptr. 368]), 
"The trial court is not bound by the opinions of the wit-
nesses on market value .... [T]he province of such testi-
mony is only to aid the court in arriving at a conclusion." 
(Joint Highway Dist. No.9 v. Ocean Shore R.R. Co. (1933) 
128 Cal.App. 743, 762 [18 P.2d 413].) 
The Hemmerlings contend that the rejection of their evi-
dence would necessitate the inherently improbable conclusions 
that the water easements were worth nothing and therefore 
that plaintiff was willing to pay $9,450 for 1,000 square feet 
of land or approximately $400,000 an acre. It would not fol-
low, however, from a rejection of the Hemmerlings' evidence 
that the water easements were valueless. The trial court may 
have been of the view that all of the parties lost valuable 
water rights. The fact that the other condemnees were not 
using the irrigation system at the time of the condemnation 
does not establish that they were not damaged by the loss, for 
it may nevertheless have diminished the market 'Talue of their 
lands. 
[6] For the purposes of retrial we point out that none of 
the parties is entitled to severance damages. In addition to 
other requirements, such damages can only be -allowed when 
there is unity of use between the parcel conden~.ned and the 
parcel retained. There was no such connection of us~ between 
the fee interests in parcel 4 and the dominant tenements" 'as 
to make the enjoyment of the parcel taken reasonably and 
substantially necessary to the enjoyment of the parcels 
left, ... '" (City of Stockton v. Marengo (1934) 137 Cal. 
App. 760, 766 [31 P.2d467] ; Ciiy of Menlo Pa'rk v. Artino 
(1957) 151 CaI.App.2d 261, 270 [311 P.2d 135].) The parties' 
fee interests in parcel 4 contributed nothing to the enjoyment 
of the remaining parcels. Although their water rights had 
their source in parcel 4, those water rights were separately 
owned easements, and the parties will be fully compensated 
by payment of the value of parcel 4 and those easements. 
The judgment is reversed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
67 C.2d-18 
